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Abstract 
This paper discusses the discourses by which land reform policies in South Africa have 
been justified and criticized. Critical thought is needed about the underlying assumptions 
and frameworks informing policy and critique. While key aspects of populist, ‘Left’ and 
liberal ideologies helped mobilize support for land reform after 1994, they framed ques- 
tions of equitable transformation and justice in ways that obscured the terrain of struggle 
rather than revealing it. The broad consensus on the legitimacy of land reform in the 
initial decade after 1994 was underpinned by narratives about redress and reconciliation 
that privileged reparative justice above distributive equity. It tended to obscure the 
complex trade-offs and impacts involved in implementation. Coherent policy-making was 
further undermined by simplistic oppositions between ’market’ and ‘rights-based’ 
approaches that often led to ill-targeted policies. Land and agrarian reform needs to be 
liberated from this symbolic burden. It should be informed by an understanding of the 
nature of inequality in South Africa and the contribution that agrarian change can make 
to reducing it. 
 
Time to think 
Why do we want land and agrarian reform in South Africa? Why should its policies 
be supported? Much can be said about its stated purposes and goals, but why do these 
goals matter – and to whom? Rather than evaluate land policies in terms of their own 
objectives, this paper sets them in context and explores their role in the larger moral 
and ideological economy of post-Apartheid politics.There are divergent understandings 
of what land and agrarian reform is about, or why it matters. Land and agrarian 
reform is contested, available to be annexed or appropriated by a range of different 
political and ideological projects. Moreover, ‘land reform’ is hardly ever only about 
land. ‘Land’ matters not simply as a resource or material reality, but also as an empty 
signifier (Laclau 1990): a ‘field of meaning’ available for appropriation by a wide range 
of different political projects; a powerful, material metaphor for deeply conflictual 
political processes extending well beyond the matters directly addressed in land reform 
policy. 
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Land reform is therefore in part also a metaphorical act, and relates to struggles and 
antagonisms that extend well beyond its literal and material consequences. These issues 
cannot be ignored. We need to think more critically about how land and agrarian 
reform is imagined and evaluated. Without such thinking, questions of equitable 
transformation and justice are too easily framed in ways that obscure the terrain of 
struggle rather than revealing it, and which make complex policy questions harder, 
rather than easier, to resolve. 
 
A fragile consensus 
One of the more interesting aspects of the land reform agenda of the early 1990s is 
that it existed at all. In the early years of the transition, the South African debate 
about land and agrarian policy seemed irreconcilably divided (the ANC for mass 
collectivization; an NGO Left built around the struggles of isolated rural communities; 
an urban-based union movement informed by an adversarial, industrial model of 
labour relations; truculent representatives of ‘organized’ – i.e. white – agriculture 
promising to let loose the dogs of war if their way of life was interfered with; and 
business opinion – also white – seeing white farming as a liability, but deeply worried 
about nationalization and property rights). In a short while this gave way to a broad 
consensus around the Department of Land Affairs’ White Paper on land reform (DLA 
1997). Usually, accounts of this shift focus on the compromise on the property clause 
(e.g. Ntsebeza 2007), but this does not answer the question of what enabled this 
compromise to be accepted so widely. An important role was played by a series of 
policy interventions (by the World Bank, but also by South African agricultural 
economists inside the DBSA and policy- makers inside the ANC) that allowed the 
development of an agenda that appeared to reconcile the aims of national 
reconciliation, deracialization, global economic integration and jobs for the poor 
(Williams 1996; Hall 2010). This was made possible by the way in which these very 
different projects were framed as elements of a seamless narrative of enlightened 
humanist modernization. 
 
This programme commanded assent across a wide spectrum of political opinion. But 
this support drew on a number of different legitimizing frameworks, each of which 
presupposed a very different political project. One discourse was primarily 
concerned with notions of national food security, sustainability and economic efficiency. 
Land reform, from this point of view, required the abolition of the institutional 
environment that had protected inefficient farmers from market pressures and that had 
created an oppressive racial order in the countryside. The aim was to create an 
efficient, globally integrated and deracialized commercial agricultural sector. 
 
A second framework situated land reform within the problematic of national 
reconciliation, restorative justice and reparation. Support for land reform was premised 
on the need to deal with the politically charged legacy of land theft and dispossession. 
This discourse had two very different inflections: on the one hand, there was a 
populist, African nationalist project that emphasized the injustice of colonial land theft 
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and problematized the legitimacy of the post-Apartheid racial order as such. Closely 
related to it but quite distinct, was an essentially liberal discourse focusing on 
restitution, reconciliation and redress within a post-1910 framework. 
 
A third framework understood injustice as pivoting crucially on the violation of 
human rights. From this point of view, land and agrarian reform needed to create a 
legal framework that could protect and empower the marginalized and vulnerable. A 
fourth stream saw land reform as serving the aims of equitable economic growth and 
agrarian transformation, and saw land reform as ‘kickstart[ing] rural development’ (ANC 
1994). 
 
The ability to link these four discursive frameworks was at one and the same time the 
programme’s greatest strength and its greatest weakness. The narrative crafted by the 
RDP and the White Paper presented land reform as of a ‘win–win’ process that would 
deliver stability, reconciliation, justice and economic growth. But its very success in 
creating a compelling metanarrative made it all the more difficult to name, and engage 
with, the contradictions and tensions that emerged when trying to implement this 
vision. 
 
Dreams of reparation 
One consequence was that the implementation of land reform became entangled 
with the psychological and political aftermath of Apartheid’s history, and the challenge 
it posed for the formation of a coherent national identity. An important role was played by 
the apparent fragility of the consensus upon which political stability depended, and 
the enormous risks (real or imagined) associated with the dread possibility of a 
return to de facto civil war. But these dynamics also contributed to the highly charged 
nature of the terrain of reconstruction itself. Anger at the injustices of the past; fear of 
retribution; sorrow, fear and guilt about injustices caused; confused desires for 
redemption and vindication – all these were (and still are!) richly present for all 
participants. This means that the politics of South African identity formation are what 
Freudians would call deeply cathected: every event or act is pregnant with meanings 
infused by histories well beyond the intentions of the actors; every fact (however 
nuanced and complex reality might be) is available for construction as evidence for 
powerful and often reductive narratives of betrayal, retribution, bad faith, triumph, 
failure and so on. 
 
Into this superheated crucible fell the policies and implementation of rural development 
and land reform. Cherryl Walker has described the burdens imposed by this reparative 
project on the implementation of land restitution (Walker 2005). One of the striking 
aspects of restitution policy has been the disjuncture between the wide and unreflective 
public support for the idea of restitution and the messy, conflictual and unsatisfactory 
nature of implementation. On the Left, this is commonly seen simply as the result of 
promises betrayed and the failure of ‘political will’. Others blame bureaucratic 
incompetence and inefficiency. What these explanations fail to take into account are the 
difficulties that arise when the implementation of real-world policy is entangled with an 
essentially symbolic drama: one in which the injustices suffered by specific claimants 
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come to stand for the violence of Apartheid itself; in which claimants come to 
represent Apartheid’s victims as such; and in which the redress of particular wrongs 
serves as metaphorical healing for ‘the nation’ as a whole. Compelling as these 
associations might be, they do not offer a helpful framework for the resolution of the 
significant real-world complexities of implementation. Rather than a process in which 
victims could be (actually and symbolically) recompensed, restitution has become a 
policy deluged by jostling victims with conflicting and overlapping claims – and this in 
a rights-based and judicial framework in which anyone with access to a lawyer can hold 
the process hostage. 
 
The converse is also true. The problem is not only that land reform implementation can 
be derailed by symbolic politics. In addition, nation-building is not served by making 
something as important as ‘national reconciliation’ and the legitimacy of the post-
Apartheid order depen- dent on something as tricky as land reform.The sustainability of 
the post-Apartheid order does require dealing with the political legacies of the past. But 
these legacies should be addressed in more effective and constructive ways, and need to 
go well beyond the specificities of local histories of land loss. 
 
Quite distinct from the restitution project’s concern with reconciliation and nation-
building are more populist approaches that expect land reform to address the history 
of colonial land theft before 1910. As is evident from Mugabe’s famous description of the 
need for land reform as ‘the last colonial question’ (Mugabe 2000), such demands 
problematize the legitimacy of the post-colonial political order as such. Given the lack 
of equitable social change and the persistence of deep racial inequalities 17 years after 
the transition, their appeal is understandable. But such demands have dangerous 
consequences for progressive politics – and not only because of the potential 
destructiveness of a Zimbabwe-style ‘fast track land reform’ for South Africa. As Walker 
has pointed out, these discourses give pride of place to Apartheid-era and essentialist 
constructions of identity, and often marginalize gender (Walker 2005). In addition, 
they are often premised on idealized notions of a pre-colonial past. The tendency to 
link land and identity so closely and ahistorically creates huge problems in the context 
of the high degrees of migrancy, mobility and ongoing displacement to be found in 
present-day Southern Africa. In addition, essentialist Africanist discourses about colonial 
land theft potentially provide ideological cover for processes of elite enrichment that 
have little to do with equitable change. 
 
Rights and violations 
The enactment of reparative fantasies is not the only way in which concerns with 
historical injustices animate land and agrarian reform policy. It is also important to 
consider a related but distinct project – one that is focused on the protection and 
realization of human rights. Here, I want to focus on the difficulties faced by rights-based 
approaches in engaging effectively with equitable transformation on South Africa’s 
commercial farmlands. These difficulties relate in particular to the way in which rights-
based approaches often involve a tendency to frame issues of social justice as pivoting 
essentially on the defence of people against the violation of their rights by other actors 
(see, e.g., HRW 2011). Advocacy campaigns on behalf of farm workers or other 
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marginalized rural people all too often portray poor and marginal people simply as 
powerless victims who need to be rescued or defended from the depredations of 
powerful persecutors. It is easy to see why this happens – particularly when 
campaigners need to appeal to distant, apolitical and uninformed audiences in the 
global North. But powerful as such narratives are, they can lead to a dangerous 
narrowing of the scope of concern. Activists are not well served by a legal framework that 
allows them only to become involved when there has been a violation. Not only do such 
approaches involve unrealistic expectations about the extent and reach of the regulatory 
power of a capacity-strapped state. In addition, they all too often involve an exclusive 
concern with the apparent exceptionalism of particular violations, while failing to 
problematize the exploitative social relations and impoverishing practices that constitute 
the normal operations of capitalist economies. 
 
Perhaps the most significant example is the promulgation and implementation of the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) of 1997, which sought to address farm 
worker vulnerability by creating a regulatory framework for evictions and by providing 
for the establishment of tenure rights at retirement age for long-term farm dwellers. It 
may indeed be that this strong emphasis on land rights was appropriate in parts of 
the country (e.g. in Limpopo) where the key interests of farm workers themselves 
were indeed bound up with long-existent and economically vital relationships to 
contested land (Cousins and Hall 2011). But in labour-absorptive Western Cape 
horticulture, where farm workers’ livelihoods were primarily dependent on 
employment, and where a high degree of mobility was an essential part of the survival 
and coping strategies of a transient farm dweller population (Waldman 1993), the policy 
did little to shift power relations in farm workers’ favour, and arguably did much to 
worsen them. Research is divided on the extent to which ESTA contributed to the 
uneven but significant trend towards the downsizing, casualization and externalization 
of farm labour. 
 
Clearly agro-food deregulation, supermarket power, price pressure and the tightening of 
labour law also played a key role. But it is hard to deny that it exacerbated those trends 
(Du Toit and Ally 2004; Ewert and Du Toit 2005). With the stroke of a pen, the 
promulgation of ESTA turned Western Cape farmers’ investments in farm worker 
housing into liabilities: while, in the 1980s, modernizing employers had seen the 
improvement of housing as essential to retaining skilled workers, housing was now seen 
as a foothold for the establishment of unwanted tenure rights. It also killed off any 
chance, slender though it may have been, of a ‘corporatist deal’ in which progressive 
elements of commercial agriculture, the state and the union movement could agree on 
ways in which farm employment could be protected under conditions of 
globalization. 
 
The issue is not whether rights in general are good things (obviously the entrenchment 
and defence of rights can be vital), but the question is which rights, how and where. The 
answers to those questions need to be based on an understanding of the nature of 
capitalist exploitation, historical process and local social relations of power. In the 
absence of such an understanding, purely rights-based approaches have little critical 
traction, and can all too easily be marginalized or appropriated by a liberal politics.That, 
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at any rate, is what happened on the farmlands of the Western Cape. The tendency of 
rural CBOs and NGOs to focus on the excesses of an increasingly beleaguered and 
marginalized white family farming class have led them to ignore, and sometimes even to 
collude with, the large-scale consolidation of corporate and agribusiness power. 
 
Placing distributive justice at the centre 
What then, are the options for an agrarian politics concerned with social equity in 
South Africa? A concern with reparative justice all too easily sidelines a focus on present-
day distributive justice, and a narrow focus on rights (including land rights) risks 
ignoring or legitimizing the social processes and relations of capitalist exploitation. 
What would it look like to put distribu- tive justice and a concern with social inequality 
at the centre of agrarian policy? This is a complex issue, but it is possible to list some 
basic strictures, warnings and guidelines. 
 
Understand and accept the reality of urbanization. To begin with, any agrarian policy 
needs to accept the ‘extreme and exceptional’ nature of the South African ‘land question’ 
as articulated by Henry Bernstein (1996). Agrarian policy cannot be about ‘turning back 
the clock’. It has to be about equitable social transformation in the interests of South 
Africa’s poor as they exist at this moment in history – including the urban poor. Land and 
agrarian reform is not an exclusively ‘rural’ matter: it is about food security, economic 
justice and livelihoods both in town and in the countryside.This means that agricultural 
land should be seen as a valuable national resource – and that land reform policy should 
consider the food needs of the urban poor. 
 
From this, it follows that the challenges arising out of ‘the land question’ cannot be dealt 
with in terms of land policy alone. The marginalization and structural exclusion created by 
land theft (and by capitalist adverse incorporation) needs to be dealt with – but the 
response needs to take the form of a coherent policy for pro-poor growth that informs 
economic policy more generally. Similarly, the potent political charge created by the 
memories and transmitted histories of Apartheid injustices need to be dealt with – but 
it is only in a small minority of cases that they can be dealt with through the vehicle of 
land reform. 
 
This does not mean that there is not a land question. We should accept the reality of poor 
people’s land demands: but this is not a demand for a return to an agrarian past. It is a 
demand for tenure security and residential land that will allow for security, survival and 
‘accumulation from below’ in the harsh and unforgiving context of the present-day 
South African economy. The key problem relates essentially to design of equitable 
human settlements, local government, land use and spatial planning. One question is 
how land reform can be used more assertively to reconfigure Apartheid’s spatial 
legacy in rural areas. Another challenge is developing a sense of how tenure security and 
land-based activities form part of a mix of economic activities in peri-urban areas and 
denser rural settlements (Aliber et al. 2011). We should, by the way, forgo the stirring and 
meaningless talk about ‘vibrant rural communities’ that characterizes develop- ment 
speak on this issue (e.g. DRDLR 2009). Such language merely encourages a flight into 
fantasy. We should focus instead on the reality of what’s there – marginalized and 
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hybrid livelihoods supported by remittances, social grants and informal self-employment 
– and figure out how these can be protected, sustained and encouraged to grow. 
 
We should recognize that we still lack convincing models of commercial agriculture that are 
economically equitable and environmentally sustainable. Here, we are in a double bind. 
Large-scale commercial agriculture is unlikely to contribute to meaningful levels of 
employment, is unsustainably reliant on fossil fuels and agrochemicals, and without 
expensive racial transformation it will remain a political embarrassment. The potential 
of small-scale agriculture to deal with these difficulties is a matter of intense scholarly 
debate (see, e.g.,Wiggins 2009). Although small-scale agriculture may be more efficient 
in some respects, and though it is probably more employment intensive, small-scale 
farmers are poorly positioned to compete in centralized, buyer-driven value chains, are 
not necessarily more committed to sustainable practices, and are unlikely to be able to 
meet the urban poor’s demand for cheap food (Mather 2005). More seriously, even if a 
small-farmer sector could in theory meet all these requirements, there is the small 
matter of getting there. Outcomes are path dependent, and transformation will be 
costly. There is a need to go beyond general and ideological battles around the virtues of 
small- versus large-scale farming; and to explore whether there are viable and workable 
models for change. 
 
A focus on land and agrarian reform that looks only at landownership and at primary 
production is misdirected, and will ignore the ways in which agribusiness and large 
corporations are trans- forming the agro-food sector in their own interests. A progressive 
agrarian policy will therefore need to focus on the contestation of power relations in the 
food system as a whole. While land reform implementation has gone adrift, and while 
rural NGOs have focused on the outrage of human rights violations by a dwindling 
population of commercial farmers, the stable door is open and the horse has bolted: 
commercial restructuring of agriculture here and abroad is driving processes of 
jobless de-agrarianization for huge surplus populations who have been pushed off the 
land, but who are no being reabsorbed into non-farm employment (Li 2007). One 
challenge is developing approaches to reining in corporate power, and at the very least 
ensuring that value chain governance happens in more pro-poor ways. Another is 
finding ways of supporting the development of local food economies not entirely 
dominated by corporates, and in which small farmers and local vendors can participate. 
 
What emerges, then, is a politics of agrarian reform that perhaps seems much more 
modest. The argument of this paper involves questioning the heroic role often thrust 
upon ‘land reform’ in popular imagination on the Left. Far from seeing land reform as 
a central, self-contained project of massive redistribution, it is better imagined as a 
component of a much more encom- passing but also more constrained process of 
political and socio-economic change in South African society as a whole. 
 
Does this amount legitimizing the ‘status quo’ in the South African countryside? I do 
not think so. A radical project of critique and fostering equitable social change in South 
Africa is possible. But such a project has to start with a recognition of the terrain as it 
exists at this time, not as we would wish it to be; with an accurate assessment of 
where the critical points of contestation really are – and with critical awareness of 
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the often unexamined underlying assumptions, desires and fantasies that animate and 
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